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ABSTRACT
e Internet ofings promises a connected environment reacting
to and addressing our every need, but based on the assumption that
all of our movements and words can be recorded and analysed to
achieve this end. Ubiquitous surveillance is also a precondition for
most dystopian societies, both real and fictional. How our personal
data is processed and consumed in an ever more connected world
must imperatively be made transparent, and more effective tech-
nical solutions than those currently on offer, to manage personal
data must urgently be investigated.
e need for greater transparency
We have all read market predictions describing billions of devices
and the hundreds of billions of dollars in profit that the Internet
of ings (IoT) promises.1 Security and the challenges it repre-
sents [27] are oen highlighted as major issues for IoT, alongside
scalability and standardisation. In 2017, FBI Director James Comey
warned, during a senate hearing, of the threat represented by a bot-
net taking control of devices owned by unsuspecting users. Such
a botnet can seize control of devices ranging from connected dish-
washers,2 to smart home cameras and connected toys, not only us-
ing them as a platform to launch cyber aacks, but also potentially
harvesting the data such devices collect.
In addition to concerns about cybersecurity, corporate usage of
personal data has seen increased public scrutiny. A recent focus
of concern has been connected home hubs (e.g., Amazon Alexa,
Google Home).3 Articles on the topic discussed whether conversa-
tionswere being constantly recorded and if so, where those records
went. Similarly, the University of Rennes faced a public backlash
aer revealing its plan to deploy smart-beds in its accommodation
to detect “abnormal” usage paerns.4 A clear question emerges
from IoT-related fears, “how and why is my data being used?”
As concerns grow, legislators across the world are taking action
in order to protect the public. For example, the recent EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which took effect in May
2018,5 and the forthcoming ePrivacy Regulation6 place strong re-
sponsibility on data controllers to protect personal data, and to no-
tify users of security breaches. e EU commission defines a Data
Controller as the party that determines the purposes for which,
and the means by which, personal data is processed (why and how
the data is processed). EU regulations further impose constraints
on where EU citizens data can be processed and what type of data
1hps://goo.gl/udt9vh
2hps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7240
3hps://www.wired.com/2016/12/alexa-and-google-record-your-voice/
4hps://goo.gl/pzC1Kz
5hp://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/index.htm
6hps://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/proposal-eprivacy-regulation
(i.e., “special category” data falls under more stringent constraints).
e data controller must provide means for end users to determine
whether their data is properly handled and means to effect their
rights. Overall, there must be mechanisms to determine what data
is processed, how, why and where.
Such concerns have drawn researchers to look at means to de-
velopmore accountable and transparent systems [10, 24]. e prob-
lem has also been clearly highlighted by the EU Data Protection
Working Party: “As a result of the need to provide pervasive services
in an unobtrusive manner, users might in practice find themselves
under third-party monitoring. is may result in situations where
the user can lose all control on the dissemination of his/her data, de-
pending on whether or not the collection and processing of this data
will be made in a transparent manner or not.”
Indeed, modern computing systems contain many components
that operate as black boxes; they accept inputs and generate out-
puts but do not disclose their internal working. Beyond privacy
concerns, this also limits the ability to detect cyber-aacks, ormore
generally to understand cyber-behaviour. Because of these con-
cerns DARPA, in the US, launched theTransparentComputing project7
to explore means to build more transparent systems through the
use of digital provenance with the particular aim of identifying ad-
vanced persistent threats. While DARPA’s work is a good start, we
believe that there is an urgent need to reach much further. In the
rest of the article, we explore how provenance can be an answer to
some IoT concerns and the challenges faced to deploy provenance
techniques.
Digital Provenance
ere is a growing clamour for more transparency, but straightfor-
ward, widespread technical solutions have yet to emerge. Typical
soware log records oen prove insufficient to audit complex dis-
tributed systems as they fail to capture the complex causality rela-
tionships between events. Digital provenance [8] is an alternative
means to record system events. Digital provenance is the record of
information flow within a computer system in order to assess the
origin of data (e.g., its quality or its validity).
e concept first emerged in the database research community
as a means to explain the response to a given query [16]. Prove-
nance research later expanded to address issues of scientific repro-
ducibility, notably by providing mechanisms to reconstitute com-
putational environments from formal records of scientific compu-
tations [23]. More recently, provenance has been explored within
the cybersecurity community [25] as ameans to explain intrusions [18]
or more recently to detect them [14].
Provenance records are represented as a directed acyclic graph
that shows causality relationships between the states of the objects
7hps://www.darpa.mil/program/transparent-computing
that compose a complex system. As a consequence, it is compati-
ble with automated mathematical reasoning. In such a graph, the
vertices represent the state of transient and persistent data items,
transformations applied to those states, and persons (legal or natu-
ral) responsible for data and transformations (generally referred to
as entities, activities and agents respectively). e edges represent
dependencies between these entities. e analysis of such a graph
allows us to understand where, when, how, by whom and why data
has been used [7, 9].
An outcomeof research on provenance in the cybersecurity space
is the understanding that the capture mechanism must provide
guarantees of completeness (i.e., all events in the system can be
seen), accuracy (i.e., the record is faithful to events) and a well-
defined, trusted computing base (i.e., the threat model is clearly
expressed) [22]. Otherwise, aacks on the system may be unde-
tected, dissimulated by the aacker or misaributed. We argue
that in a highly ad hoc and interoperable environment with mutu-
ally untrusted parties, the provenance used to empower end users
with control and understanding over data usage requires similar
properties.
Who to trust?
In the IoT environment the number of involved stakeholders has
the potential to explode exponentially. Traditionally, a company
managed its own server infrastructure, maybe with the help of a
subcontractor. e cloud computing paradigm further increased
complexity with the involvement of cloud service providers (some-
times stacked, e.g., Heroku PaaS on top of the Amazon IaaS cloud
service), third party service providers (e.g., CloudMQTT) and other
tenants sharing the infrastructure. e IoT further increases this
complexity, with potentially ad hoc and unforeseen interactions be-
tween devices and services on top of the complex cloud and edge
computing infrastructure most IoT services rely on.
One answer to this problem is to build applications in “silos”
where the involved parties are known in advance, but as a side-
effect locking-in devices and services to a single company (e.g.,
the competing smart-home offerings by leading technology com-
panies). is is far from the IoT vision of a connected environment,
butmost existing products fall in this category. ere are obviously
major business considerations behind this model, and it should be
noted that the EU GDPR mandates for some form of interoperabil-
ity (although it is yet unclear how it should be interpreted [12]).
An alternative to such “lock-in” would be to make devices’ con-
sumption of data transparent and accountable. If data is exchanged
across devices, the concerned user should be able to audit its us-
age. However, in an environment where arbitrary devices could
interact (although it must be remembered that EU GDPR requires
explicit and informed user consent), how can trust be established
in the audit record? is requires an in-depth rethinking of how
IoT platforms are designed, potentially exploring the security-by-
design approach based on hardware roots of trust [13] to provide
trusted digital enclaves in which behaviour can be audited and
to encourage some form of “accountability-by-design” principles
where transparency and the implementation of a trustworthy au-
dit mechanism is a core concern in product design.
Such solutions have been explored in the provenance space, for
example, by leveraging Soware Guard Extensions (SGX) proper-
ties to provide a strong guarantee of the integrity of the prove-
nance record [4]. Similarly, remote aestation techniques lever-
aging Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware have been pro-
posed [6] to guarantee the integrity of the capture mechanism.
However, how to provide such guarantees in an IoT environment,
where such hardware features may not be available, is a relatively
unexplored topic.
Where does the audit live?
e fully realised IoT vision is of vast distributed and decentralised
systems. If we assume trustworthy provenance capture is achiev-
able, the issue of guaranteeing that the provenance record can be
audited remains. If you are to audit the processing of personal data,
guarantees about the integrity and availability of the provenance
record must exist. If you agreed to share your daily activity for
research, the activities of insurance companies scraping your data
for possible health risks must not be able to masquerade as benign
research use, nor should data collection for political purposes be
able to pass as harmless entertainment, as in the Cambridge Ana-
lytica scandal.8 Similarly, the availability (durability) of the audit
record must be guaranteed. ere is no point to an audit record if
it can simply be deleted.
Further,Moyer et al. evaluated the storage requirements of prove-
nance when used for security purposes in relatively modest dis-
tributed systems [21]. In such a context, several thousands of graph
elements can be generated per second and per machine, resulting
in a graph containing billions of nodes to represent system execu-
tion over several months. It is unclear how some past research out-
comes: e.g., detection of suspicious behaviour [2], privacy-aware
provenance [11] or provenance integrity [15]; scale to very large
graphs as such concernswere not evaluated. Similarly, while blockchain
is heralded [19] as an integrity-preserving means to store prove-
nance, it is unclear how well it could expand to such scale. Several
options have been explored to reduce graph size, such as identi-
fying and tracking only sensitive data objects [5] or performing
property-preserving graph compression [17] however none has
yet adequately addressed the scalability challenge.
How to communicate information?
Means must be developed to communicate about data usage, but
also about the risks of inference from the data. Not only must the
nature of the data be considered, but also other properties such as
the frequency of capture [3]. For example, a 100Hz smart meter
reading can in some cases indicate what television channel is cur-
rently being watched; even a daily average reading could inform
about occupancy. Here, it is important to be able to explore and
represent the outcome of complex computational workflow [1].
Provenance visualisation has been an active research topic for
over a decade, yet no fully satisfactory solution has been proposed.
e simplest possible visualisation is to render the graph, however
beyond trivially simple graphs such a representation is too com-
plex and dense to be easily understood, even by experts. We go
further and suggest that educational background, socio-economic
8hps://goo.gl/pPXhZ1
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environment and culturemay play a part in how interpretable such
information is.
In order tomake the accountability and transparency of IoT plat-
forms effective, a beer communication mediummust be provided.
An approach oen taken is to analyse motifs in the graph to extract
high-level abstractions (e.g., Missier et al. [20]), meaningful to the
average end-user. In recent work [26], it was proposed to represent
such a high-level abstractions as a comic strip.
We need to care about digital provenance
Building transparent and auditable systemsmay be one of the great-
est soware engineering challenges of the coming decade. As a
consequence, digital provenance and its application to cybersecu-
rity and the management of personal data has become a hot re-
search topic. We have highlighted key active areas of research and
their associated challenges. It is fundamental for industry practi-
tioners to understand the threat posed by the black-box nature of
the IoT, the potential solutions, and the challenges to a practical
deployment of those solutions. Accountability-by-design must be-
come a core objective of IoT platforms.
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